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Abstract
The achievement of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals approved by the UN General Assem-
bly in 2015 will depend on whether or not the last goal, “global partnership for sustainable deve-
lopment,” will work. The paper suggests that the leading principle for effective global partnership 
should be the rebalancing of the negotiating power of the different stakeholders. Section I briefly 
sketches some changes to the notion of development and of cooperation since 1950. Section 
II describes the process which has led to the SDGs and to the idea of cooperation as a global 
partnership. Section III focuses on two major economic changes which have taken place since the 
seventies: economic growth in Asia and the rise of international finance. Both of which have huge 
implications for the SDGs and for global partnership. Section IV presents three steps which could 
help to implement “global partnership for development” according to the principle of rebalancing. 
Developing countries need more policy space especially in their trade and fiscal policies. 
Keywords: Development, goals, cooperation, crisis
Resumen
El logro de los 17 Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible aprobados por la Asamblea General de las 
Naciones Unidas en 2015 dependerá en gran medida del funcionamiento del último objetivo: “Aso-
ciación global para el desarrollo sostenible”. El documento sugiere que el punto principal para una 
asociación global efectiva debería ser el reequilibrio del poder de negociación de las diferentes 
partes interesadas. De esta manera, en la sección I se describen brevemente algunos cambios 
en la noción de desarrollo y cooperación desde 1950. En la Sección II se describe el proceso que 
ha conducido a los ODS y a la idea de cooperación como asociación mundial. La sección III se 
centra en dos grandes cambios económicos que han tenido lugar desde la década de los setenta: 
el crecimiento económico en Asia y el auge de las finanzas internacionales. Ambos hechos tienen 
enormes implicaciones para los ODS y para la asociación global. La sección IV presenta tres pa-
sos que podrían ayudar a implementar la “asociación global para el desarrollo” de acuerdo con el 
principio de reequilibrio. Los países en desarrollo necesitan más espacio político, especialmente 
en sus políticas comerciales y fiscales.
Palabras clave: Desarrollo, Objetivo de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS), cooperación, crisis.
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k 1. Introduction
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 
II describe in an extremely synthetic way the 
main evolution in the notions of development 
and of cooperation since the sixties up to the 
new Sustainable Development Goals, SDGs. 
Of course this is not a comprehensive review 
of the two issues, for that one can read the very 
helpful work of Tassara 2012. The paper shows 
that the notion of development has received a 
much broader content than it was in the sixties, 
when it  was by and large defined in terms of 
economic growth. Development is now a mul-
ti-faced phenomenon and it is also focused 
on people’s empowerment, there has been a 
clear movement towards the individual, micro, 
aspects,  while the more structural and macro 
feature are now less central.
Section III presents a brief view of the evolu-
tion from the Millennium Development Goals, 
MDGs, to the SDGs and in focuses on the last 
MDG and SDGs, both on global partnership, 
which seems to be the new view of cooperation.
But how can this view be implemented? De-
velopment and cooperation do not take place 
in the vacuum and must not be confused with 
the numerous discussions, proposals, debates 
which are being putting forward every day. De-
velopment and cooperation/partnership must 
take into account the social, economic and 
political structures existing in our world and 
we  must realistically examine the opportunities 
and the constraints of this global ‘environment’. 
Therefore section IV brings us down to the real 
world and describes two major changes in the 
this global economic environment: economic 
growth in Asia and the growing role of interna-
tional finance. These two facts greatly influence 
the environment in which the SDGs must be 
pursued through global partnership.
Section V faces SDG 17 and provides some 
suggestions on how to support to make global 
partnership work in the new economic lands-
cape, briefly described in Section IV. Here we 
find the general principle which should lead all 
the negotiations which are inevitably necessary 
in order to engage  with the SDGs. The paper 
suggests the general principle of re-balancing 
of the negotiating powers as the leading way 
to try to make global partnership not only fair 
but also effective. Re-balancing is a way to put 
into action  the two principles of universality and 
differentiation which are in the UN declaration 
of September 2015. This section provides also 
some examples of what re-balancing should be 
and it examines some of the topics which are 
part of SDG 17 such as trade, fiscal and indus-
trial policies. 
2. The evolution of the notions  of 
development and of international 
cooperation (in a nutshell)
A.  In the beginning it was economic 
growth
On September 25-27, 2016 the seventieth ses-
sion of the United Nations General Assembly 
approved a resolution  called  Transforming our 
world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Develo-
pment with 17 Sustainable Development Goals, 
SDGs, and 169 targets, now we have also 241 
indicators(see UN, 2015 and UN-ECOSOC, 
2016). This resolution, also called Agenda 
2030, presents a very wide view of develop-
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ment and in many ways the SDGs can be re-
garded as sort of contemporary consensus on 
what development is all about. Sixty years ago 
there were different views.
Once upon a time there was economic growth: 
development was mainly defined in terms of in-
creases in income per capita and it was by and 
large regarded as a one dimensional notion. In 
development economics there was, and still is, 
a theory explaining that low income countries 
will converge to the income per capita of the 
high income ones. The accumulation of physi-
cal capital was regarded as the main element 
in the explanation of economic growth and So-
low’s 1956 model implies that capital will flow to 
low income economies where it is scarce and 
hence it can yield higher returns. Technical pro-
gress too will also move freely across countries 
and provided that the markets are competitive 
and given enough time all countries will tend to 
have similar incomes per capita.
If this views were correct there would be no need 
for developmental theories and policies, nor 
for cooperation activities. Cooperation should 
confine itself to the mitigation of the short run 
unpleasant occurrences which might be asso-
ciated the long run process of economic grow-
th. Cooperation should provide safety nets and 
care for basic needs and human development.
Since the late forties there have been econo-
mic views which are quite skeptical about the 
efficiency of the market economy and its abi-
lity to bring wellbeing to all countries. These 
non-mainstream contributions date back to the 
structural change approach of Raul Prebisch 
and Hans Singer. In the late sixties and in the 
seventies  Dudley Seers and the International 
Labour Office, ILO, highlight the importance 
of  employment and of decent work(see Seers, 
1969 and ILO, 1976). Sunna and Gualerzi pro-
vide a very useful reading to these heterodox 
economic views on development, which howe-
ver they too focused on the economic compo-
nent of development (see Sunna and Gualerzi 
2016, chapters 3 and 5).
Coming back to the more optimistic views about 
the economic perspectives of developing coun-
tries it is easy to see that apart from East Asia 
the eighties and nineties have not seen much 
convergence of most low income countries 
towards the living standards of high income 
economies. Moreover theoretical studies and 
practical experience have shown that economic 
growth alone does not guarantee participatory 
and sustainable development. There are rapidly 
growing countries where social hardships are 
multiplying and new forms of poverty are being 
created.  There are other countries where des-
pite slow growth considerable improvements 
have been made in terms human development 
and well-being. 
Nowadays development is no longer defined in 
terms of income per capita only; development is 
regarded as a multi-faced phenomenon and as 
evolving process. Let us briefly point out some 
of the major contributions to this new view. It all 
started with the debates in the sixties and se-
venties, but it was only towards the end of the 
eighties which a general consensus began to 
emerge on a broader definition of development, 
(more in Vaggi, 2010).
Three major contributions to this change can be 
identified.
First, the 1987 Bruntland Report by the United 
nations gives a first definition of sustainable 
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needs of present generations without compro-
mising the possibilities of future generations 
(see United Nations, 1987). With this report the 
environment dimension and the idea of sustai-
nability become essential aspects of the notion 
of development.
Second, in 1990 we have the first Human Deve-
lopment Report by UNDP with the Human Deve-
lopment Index, which includes not only income, 
but also education and health(see UNDP, 1990).
Third, in September 2000 the United Nations 
present the Millenium Development Goals, 
MDGs, eight goals which provide a widely ac-
cepted definition of  development, including the 
fight against poverty, health, education, envi-
ronment and gender. 
More recently the very notion of Gross Domes-
tic Product has been criticized as an appropria-
te indicator of the standard of living of people. 
The research work focuses on the definition of 
well-being,  perhaps the most famous report is 
the Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi Report of 2008 
(see Stiglitz et al., 2008). 
Environmental sustainability receives a lot of at-
tention, see for instance the work of Dasgupta 
at Cambridge (see Dasgupta and Duraiappah, 
2012). In 2012 we have also the first World Ha-
ppiness Report by  a team led by Jeffrey Sachs 
(see Helliwell et al., 2013).
Poverty too is no longer defined in terms of in-
come only, but more in general as ‘deprivation’ 
and ‘exclusion’ or the lack of capabilities, in the 
sense of lack of the possibility to decide and to 
choose about one’s life. Since 2010 we have 
the Multidimensional Poverty Index by OPHI, 
the Oxford Poverty and Human Development 
Initiative (see Alkire et al., 2013).
All these approaches to development share 
some major similarities; we single out two of 
them. First, development corresponds to the 
enlargement of opportunities and possibilities of 
choice by the people.  Second,  development it is 
a process which is appreciated in a positive way 
by the people who are involved in it. The evolu-
tion of the notion of development and the emer-
gence of that of ‘human development’ have been 
greatly influenced by the work of Nobel Laureate 
Amartya Sen (see Sen, 1985 and 1999).
The idea of the Sustainable Development Goals 
emerged in 2011 during the preparatory works 
for the 2012 Rio+20 conference thanks to a pro-
posal by Colombia and Guatemala(see  Loewe 
and Rippin, 2015, pp. 2, 4). The COP 21 Paris 
meeting of December 2016 has been the final 
event linking development to climate change 
and environmental sustainability. However the 
notion of sustainability has already received a 
broad definition, which is not limited to the envi-
ronmental aspect(see for instance Sachs 1999).
B. International cooperation
Different views of development have been ac-
companied by different ideas about how to 
achieve it.
The eighties and nineties have been the period 
of the Washington Consensus, a term coined 
by John Williamson to indicate ten major points 
which characterized the IMF-World Bank re-
commendations to developing countries(see 
Williamson, 1990). These policies have been 
the key elements of the Structural Adjustment 
Programs of the IMF and the World Bank. The-
se standardized policies were considered to be 
necessary and sufficient to trigger economic 
Gianni Vaggi
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growth in very different countries; it was a ‘one 
recipe fits all’ approach. It is worth noticing that 
these policies were also the result of a rather 
optimistic view and limited view about the fact 
that market forces alone could generate econo-
mic growth and development.
The structural adjustment policies received 
strong criticisms. The idea of  a  post-Washing-
ton Consensus derives from a paper by Joseph 
Stiglitz in 1998 (see Stiglitz,  1998), when he 
was Senior Vice-president of the World Bank. In 
the paper Stiglitz advocates the need for more 
articulated and less economic focused policies, 
he also highlights the fact that development has 
to be interpreted in terms of broader goals, not 
just income. 
In January 1999 the then President of the World 
Bank James Wolfenshon launched the Com-
prehensive Development Framework, CDF(see 
Wolfenshon, 1999 and http://web.worldbank.
org/archive/website01013/WEB/0__CON-3.
HTM). This very ambitious, but by now rather 
forgotten, approach proposes a new methodo-
logy to approach development and the related 
policies. Development is defined in terms of 
many aspects and the analysis includes many 
different actors: the nation states, international 
organizations, civil society, the business sector. 
In a two dimensional table there is an attempt 
to identify the actors who could be more effec-
tive in pursuing each development aspect. In a 
way this approach anticipates SDG number 17, 
which deals with “...global partnership for sus-
tainable development”.
Below there is a very fats description of some 
major intentional forums which have shaped a 
widespread view on cooperation and partner-
ship: I am not interested in the precise descrip-
tion of the different contributions, but just to 
show how the idea of cooperation has evolved 
towards the notion of global partnership.
In march 2002 in Monterrey Mexico a confe-
rence was held on Financing for Development, 
from which the so called Monterrey consensus 
emerged. Developing countries should imple-
ment the appropriate policies and reforms, abo-
ve all good governance, but the rich countries 
should concretely help mainly by committing 
more and more predictable and stable resour-
ces, aid.1 In 2016 only five of countries reach 
the 0.7 percent of GDP earmarked for aid, which 
has been the UN target since the seventies(see 
OECD, 2015). From November 29 to December 
2, 2008 a second conference on Financing for 
Development was held in Doha. A Third confe-
rence of Financing for Development was held 
by the UN in Addis Ababa on July 2015 in pre-
paration for the September General Assembly(-
see UN-AAAA, 2015).
Since 2003 five High Level  Forums have been 
held in order to define the best practices in in-
ternational cooperation. The major topic of all 
these conferences has been aid effectiveness, 
which has however been examined from diffe-
rent points of view. The 2005 Paris declaration 
recommends the donor to have more accoun-
table programs, to adopt coherent aid policies 
and to coordinate among themselves. In 2008 
the third high level forum produced the Accra 
Agenda for Action in which the notion of  coun-
try ownership is underlined.
In 2011 Busan the fourth High Level Forum on 
Aid Effectiveness ended up with the Busan 
Partnership for Effective Development Co-ope-
1 In Monterrey emphasis was also laid on the theme 
of global public goods which include knowledge and re-
search(see also Sumner and Lawo, 2013, p.35).
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tiveness and not just aid effectiveness. This 
approach requires having shared evaluation 
tools between all partners, including partners 
in the ‘South’. The involvement of civil society 
is another important issue and more attention 
is dedicated to the development outcomes  of 
policies rather than to input indicators only. 
In April 2014 in Mexico City there was the First 
High-Level meeting of the Global Partnership 
for Effective Development Co-operation, which 
was in fact a follow up of all the previous High 
Level Forums and where the emphasis was on 
the partnership aspect of international coope-
ration(see UN-FHLM, 2014). All these forums 
prepared the way to SDG 17, the one dealing 
with global partnership.
The outcome of these debates about develo-
pment and cooperation can be described with 
two words: empowerment and ownership. 
Empowerment is the process of enhancing  the 
capacity of individuals or groups to make choi-
ces and to transform those choices into desired 
actions and outcomes (Alsop et al., 2006, p.10) 
Thus empowerment is the possibility to enlarge 
one’s opportunities and her set of choices.
Ownership is the ability of developing countries 
and of people to take the development pro-
cess into their own hands. Country ownership 
appears both in the Paris Declaration and in the 
Accra Agenda for Action(see above).2
² Country ownership has also been used to indicate 
the alignment of the countries to the conditionalities of the 
Structural Adjustment Programs and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers of the nineties, see Buiter, 2007. For the 
point of view of civil society organizations on country own-
ership see Interaction, 2011.
Country ownership means that there is sufficient 
political support within a country to implement its 
developmental strategy, including the projects, 
programs, and policies for which external part-
ners provide assistance. (see http://web.world-
bank.org/archive/website01013/WEB/0__CON-
5.HTM)
The country has to be in the driving seat, but of 
course is not just a problem of the central govern-
ment’s ability to take decisions, it requires the in-
volvement of all stakeholders: local governments, 
Civil Society Organizations, communities etc.
3. From the Millenium Development 
Goals to the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals
The MDGs played a very important role in hi-
ghlighting the major development challenges 
confronting developing countries and the entire 
world. Extreme poverty, was at the forefront with 
the one dollar a day story which derives mainly 
from Martin  Ravaillon’s work first exemplified 
in the 1990 World Development Report (see 
World Bank, 1990, pp.27-9). The one dollar a 
day threshold has now become 1.90 at 2011 
PPP, Purchasing Power Parities,  prices.
It might look strange that at the time in which 
the definitions of development and of poverty 
are being enlarged and enriched MDG 1 refers 
to income poverty. However we must remember 
that from 1980 to 2000 three main regions in the 
world, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle 
East and North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa 
had no increase at all in income per capita, with 
many countries experiencing a significant decli-
ne. It was the lost decades period, mainly due to 
Gianni Vaggi
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the debt crisis which erupted in Mexico in 1982. 
It was obvious to regard the fight against inco-
me poverty as a priority; as a matter of fact the 
World Bank dedicated to poverty two World De-
velopment Reports, that of 1990 and again that 
of 2000/2001(see World Bank, 1990 and World 
Bank, 2000/2001).
Since the 2012 Rio+20 conference there have 
been a lot of debates on the post 2015 goals, 
let me recall three preparatory UN documents.
The first document is the May 2013 report by 
the United Nations, The report of the High-Le-
vel Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 
Development Agenda, which includes 12 goals 
and 54 targets(see UN-HLP, 2013). This report 
stresses the fact that all goals should be exa-
mined having in mind five transformative shifts: 
leave no one behind, sustainability, jobs and in-
clusive growth, peace and institutions and glo-
bal partnership(see ibid.). The five ‘transforma-
tive shifts’ provide an indication of the priorities 
and above all of the relevant dimensions which 
should shape future policies and actions; the 
shifts appear in the September 2015 UN Reso-
lution but not with the same emphasis.
Leave no one behind implies that attention 
should focus on the most disadvantaged and 
marginalized groups and people, with very 
important implication for policies in any type 
of goal: health, education, environment, food, 
energy, water, megacities etc . This ‘shift’ does 
not appear as a separate goal in the final UNGA 
resolution of 2015, but it is quite often mentio-
ned all along that declaration.
Jobs and inclusive growth asks for a reconside-
ration of the production and consumption mo-
del and recognize that people do achieve more 
opportunities and become more independent 
mainly through access to decent growth. Mo-
reover this shift is a warning about the fact that 
not any type of growth may be inclusive. SDG 
number 8 includes some of these recommen-
dations.
Sustainability, is clearly a cross-cutting issue 
for all goals.
Of course there must be effective and open ins-
titutions, but in the post 2015 period peace will 
be a challenge in itself and cannot be limited 
to good governance, transparency, etc. Building 
peace provides a broader vision of institutions.
A second document is the report of the Open 
Working Group for Sustainable Development 
Goals presented in July 2014. The Open Wor-
king Group was established following the 
Rio+20 Conference; which is basically the text 
which will end up into the September 2015 Re-
solution(see UN-OWG, 2014).
The third document is the Synthesis Report 
presented by the UN Secretary-General on De-
cember 4th 2014 and entitled The road to dig-
nity by 2030. The report suggests to maintain 
the 17 goals but they are now clustered into six 
essential elements: dignity, people, prosperity, 
planet, justice, partnership(see UN-SR, 2014, 
p.16-19).
The three documents represent the most im-
portant contributions to the final Resolution of 
September 2015, which re-groups the goals 
into five areas of critical importance: People, 
Planet, Prosperity, Peace, Partnership, the five 
Ps. Moreover the 2015 Resolution  establishes 
that sustainability has three dimensions: econo-
mic, social and environmental, all to be pursued 
at the same time.
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are too many goals which do overlap and some 
goals are extremely ambitious: zero poverty by 
2030.3 There is also a confusion between ends 
and means, between those targets which could 
be regarded as being a final desired outcome, 
like end hunger, gender equality, and those 
goals which are indeed instrumental to achieve 
the former ones, such as energy, infrastructures.
Notice that from the 2000 MDGs to the 2015 UN 
Resolution the last goal always refers to partner-
ship. In the MDGs goal number 8 reads: Develop 
a global partnership for development.  There are 
6 targets  and 16 indicators which include issues 
such as the increase of aid, the extension of mar-
ket access, debt sustainability. MDG 8 has been 
quite often criticized because many targets and 
indicators are very difficult to measure and in ge-
neral it provides a generic commitment to achie-
ve the other goals. The story of MDG 8 is howe-
ver rather interesting because originally there 
was no goal number 8. As late as June 2000 in a 
publication by OECD, World Bank, IMF and UN 
called  A better world for all the goals were still 
seven(see OECD, 2000). MDG 8 was introdu-
ced later at the request of developing countries 
which wanted the goals to be the responsibility 
of all countries including the rich ones.
SDG 17 reads: Strengthen the means of imple-
mentation and revitalize the global partnership 
for sustainable development, with 19 targets(-
see UN, 2015). SDG 17 seems to refer more to 
the quantitative aspect, that is to say to finan-
cial support. The 2014 Synthesis Report was 
more specific asking for “better regulation and 
more stability in the international financial and 
³ Among the several comments see Maxwell, 2014 
and Engel and Knoll, 2014. On the progress and improve-
ments of SDGs over MDGs see Fukuda-Parr, 2016.
monetary system”(see UN-SR, 2014, p.22, n. 
95) and it even  suggested the possibility of 
financial transaction taxes(ibid, p.25, n. 112). 
Moreover the Synthesis Report requested the 
implementation of “comprehensive and ade-
quate financial regulations in all countries, as 
the risk of another global financial crisis has not 
be sufficiently reduced”(ibid. p. 25, n. 114). The-
se recommendations did not find their way into 
the 2015 final Resolution. 
Goal 17 confronts itself with a major issue 
which is the main topic of this paper:  how to 
give concrete content to the term ‘global part-
nership’. This implies raising the necessary re-
sources to support the SDGs which could be an 
enormous amount of money(see Greenhill and 
Prizzon, 2012).  However partnership for deve-
lopment is not just about funds  and above all 
it does not take place in a vacuum, it  must be 
implemented in a specific economic and social 
international environment. “Global partnership” 
cannot ignore some major changes that have 
taken place in the world economy since the ni-
neteen-eighties. We highlight  two of them:4
-economic growth in Asia
-the rising role of international finance.
Both facts have a structural nature; they are 
here to stay and they have huge implications for 
the new goals; it is only by taking into account 
these facts that international cooperation activi-
ties and policies can be set in a realistic context. 
We will briefly see some positive and some ne-
gative aspects of both facts.
4 For a wider discussion of both changes see Vaggi, 
2015. On Asian growth and the beautiful image of the 
“flying geese” model see UNCTAD, 1996. For a history of 
this model see Kasahara, 2013. Akyuz,2015 provides an 
interesting analysis of financial markets and developing 
countries.
Gianni Vaggi
43Revista Internacional de Cooperación y Desarrollo Vol. 3 No. 2 | Año 2016 | PP. 34-58
4. The economy strikes back: from 
G7 to G……?
A. The bright side of economic growth
Let us mention three features on the positive 
side.
First, at  the world level MDG 1, halving the 
number of those living in extreme poverty, 
less than 1.90 dollar a day at 2011 Purchasing 
Power Parities, PPP, prices, has been achieved 
thanks to economic growth in Asia and in China 
in particular. According to the so called absolute 
poverty line of 1.90 dollar a day in at 2011PPP 
prices most of the poor people now live in mi-
ddle income countries(see Sumner, 2013, p.1, 
Sumner and Lawo, 2013).
Second, the so called ‘South’ now has some 
global powers, China, perhaps India, and some 
regional powers, Brazil, South Africa and Rus-
sia, though since 2013 all three of them have 
been going through an economic slowdown. 
Emerging economies are not all the same, but 
the old divisions into rich and poor countries, into 
and north and south and the tri-partition into first, 
second and third world need to be replaced by a 
more articulated geography. The world has mo-
ved from G7 to G20 and the capitalist economy 
is still reshaping economic relations. Between 
1995 and 2012 south-south trade has doubled 
its share in world exports. Now there are more 
players on the ground and with all difficulties and 
complications there are real possibilities for sou-
th-south cooperation and the SDGs strongly em-
phasize the universal aspect of the development 
challenges rather than the north-south coopera-
tion, see Sanahuja, 2016. This does not mean 
that any type of economic relationship between 
developing countries should be automatically 
classified as South-South cooperation. Accor-
ding to the Economic Commission for Latin Ame-
rica and the Caribbean, better known as CEPAL, 
“the prevailing  relationship between China and 
Latin America and the Caribbean has been of a 
North-South nature” (ECLAC 2016, p.14).
Third, since 1998 private flows to developing 
countries have become more and more impor-
tant; Foreign Direct Investment and remittan-
ces are the largest financial flows to developing 
countries, with 600 and 450 billion of US dollars 
respectively in 2014. Remittances include only 
the officially registered ones, hundreds of billions 
are assumed to enter developing countries in an 
unofficial way. International aid is around 130 
USD billion. Private benefactors and philanthro-
py  flows have also increased enormously in the 
first fifteen years of the new millennium.5
B. However....on the dark side
Unfortunately some negative economic facts 
characterize the international economic situa-
tion and could jeopardize the progress towards 
the new SDGs.
First, since 2007-2088 a major financial cri-
sis has hit the rich countries generating large 
variability and major turbulences in financial 
markets. International finance is characterized 
by systemic risk; the best description of this 
situation is in the work of Hyman Minsky, who 
foresaw the potential damages of uncontrolled 
finance more than forty years ago. His ‘financial 
instability hypothesis’ dates back to the mid-se-
venties when the overall market for derivatives 
was still puny(see Minsky, 1974).
5 More flows could come from some new development 
banks such as the New Development Bank of the BRICS 
and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, AIIB, both 
initiatives were launched in 2014 with the backing of Chi-
na(see Griffith-Jones, 2014). 
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has worsened in all High Income economies 
reversing a pattern of increasing equality which 
had taken place from 1950 till 1980. According to 
Piketty this largely depends on the fact that du-
ring the last thirty years returns on wealth have 
been higher than the growth rates of the eco-
nomy, a fact which has led the concentration of 
wealth into the hands of few people(see Piketty, 
2013).6 SDGs 10 asks for a reduction of inequali-
ties and this is a big improvement on the MDGs; 
now equity is at the forefront in the debates about 
development, but the changes in the economic 
landscape which are discussed in this section 
show how difficult and complicated it might be 
to try to achieve this goal.7 As we shall see in the 
next section the reduction of inequalities has a 
lot to do with the way in which global partnership 
for development will be interpreted.
Third, since 2008 economic growth has been 
quite weak in most High Income Economies 
and there has been a slowdown also in emer-
ging economies. This has led to a debate on 
the so called secular stagnation hypothesis, fo-
llowing Larry Summers’ reappraisal of this term. 
Many explanations of this phenomenon focus 
on the relationship between savings and invest-
ment and on the fact that due to an excess of 
savings the real interest rate needed to equa-
te investments and savings at full employment 
level may be negative.8 This means that mone-
tary policy becomes ineffective because due 
to low inflation and low nominal rates there is a 
6 On the trends on global income inequality among 
countries see also Milanovic, 2012. 
7 Tassara, 2016 provides a very insightful analysis of 
the challenges facing Latin American countries.
8 On the various explanations for secular stagna-
tion see Baldwin and Teulings, 2014. The origin of the 
term ‘secular stagnation’ is discussed in Backhouse and 
Boianovsky, 2016.
floor, the so called Zero Bound Level, ZBL, for 
nominal rates (see Baldwin, and Teulings 2014, 
p. 2.). To put it in Keynesian terms it is as if the 
liquidity trap had become a permanent feature 
of the economy(see Krugman’s paper in Bald-
win, and Teulings 2014, p.15). At the world level 
there is an excess of savings over investments, 
we could say that investments do not growth 
enough notwithstanding cheap and abundant 
savings. Major explanations for the increase in 
savings are related to demographic changes(i-
bid., pp. 11-12, 14), and to an increase in life 
expectancy combined with lower population 
growth rate, the so called “ageing society”.9
Other authors believe that technical progress is 
losing its potentialities in terms of smaller pro-
ductivity increases than in the past(see the pa-
per by Gordon in Baldwin and Teulings, 2014).
In my view the savings glut plus demography 
plus weak technical progress hypotheses are 
not sufficient elements to explain the slowdown 
of growth rates in high income economies, it is 
necessary to look for both supply and demand 
side causes. There is a need for large invest-
ments in particular in infrastructures in both 
high income economies(see Caballero R.J. and 
Farhi E., 2014, pp. 118-119)  and in developing 
countries where population is still growing(see 
Wolff G.B., 2014, p. 146).
The present crisis has many features of a cri-
sis of overproduction with a lack of effective 
demand which derives also from the worse-
ning income distribution (see Palley, 2016). For 
many years China has been investing 35-40 per 
cent of GDP, reaching 45 per cent in 2010, whi-
le other countries in Asia have followed similar 
path, even if not with such exceptionally high in-
9 These phenomena increase the dependency ratio 
because of the raising share of pensioners.
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vestment ratios. This has contributed to a situa-
tion of overcapacity at the world level; the ove-
rall productive capacity installed could produce 
more goods than those which can profitably be 
sold on international markets. Some sectors 
appear to be saturated, the car industry being 
a case in point, but this is also the case for iron, 
for the containers see-transport business and 
for many consumer durables and also for some 
high-tech products. 
Fourth, the above situation generates huge im-
balances which manifest themselves both in 
the different growth rates among countries and 
above all in the deficits/surpluses of the trade 
and current accounts. This happens among di-
fferent countries and regions, Asia is a surplus 
region and US are a deficit country, but also 
inside the same regional areas, the Eurozone 
being an obvious example. In the twelve months 
up to July 2016  the Eurozone  as a whole had 
a hefty 3 per cent of GDP surplus in the current 
account with a similar deficit in the budget ba-
lance, but there were huge disparities within it. 
The current account surplus was more than 8 of 
the GDP in Germany and it was almost 10 per 
cent in the Netherlands.10
According to the free competitive assumption 
and to the efficient market hypothesis these im-
balances should not  exist in the long run. With 
some simplifications we could say that accor-
ding to mainstream theory capitals should flow 
from deficit to surplus countries. A deficit in the 
current account implies that these countries 
must pay for the extra imports over their exports. 
This requires an outflow in their financial ac-
count side of the balance of payment, which co-
rresponds to an inflow for the surplus countries. 
This type of capital movements should increase 
10 Germany current account surplus has been the larg-
est one in the world for many years, also when the Euro was 
stronger than in mid 2016.
the exchange rates in surplus economies and 
bring it down in the deficit ones. Therefore im-
ports from surplus-countries would be more 
expensive and exports from deficit-countries 
would be cheaper, this change in the exchange 
rate should help to reduce the imbalances.
Fifth, since the year 2000 in many developing 
countries, including Sub-Saharan Africa econo-
mic growth rates are higher than before, howe-
ver young people do not find appropriate em-
ployment. The situation is particularly severe in 
some North Africa and Middle East countries, 
from Morocco to Lebanon; in order to absorb all 
those entering the labour market these coun-
tries should generate between 2.5 and 3 million 
of new jobs every year. Remember that SDG 8 
asks for full employment and decent work for all.
In these countries there is a mismatch between 
the number of educated people looking for a 
job and the ability of the economies  to absorb 
them; quite often the result is migration. This 
fact is extremely worrying because it implies 
that even when developing countries invest in 
education, they have a high probability to lose 
many skilled workers. Education is a funda-
mental component of human development and 
it also has huge potentialities to generate inno-
vation and growth, however these potentialities 
are curtailed by the unfavourable conditions of 
the demand for labour. This is a clear case in 
which individual empowerment does not come 
through because the external environment re-
present much more a constraint than an oppor-
tunity. Decent work is a typical situation which 
can only be achieved if there are improvements 
at the personal, micro, level and also in the 
general economic conditions of the country or 
region, that is to say at the macro level. The wi-
dening of personal capabilities must be accom-
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market.
C. Neo-Mercantilism
The first four points above regard mainly high 
income countries, so why should developing 
countries bother? Unfortunately both stagna-
ting economies and structural imbalances are 
stimulating neo-mercantilistic and protectionist 
policies; nations fiercely compete on interna-
tional markets(see also UNCTAD, 2014, pp. 
17-19). Many countries try to overcome these 
difficulties with deflationary policies, which are 
made up of strict budgetary policies, compres-
sion of domestic demand and the fostering 
of exports. These policies  lead to increasing 
competition and to neo-protectionist attitudes. 
Of course not all countries can run a trade sur-
plus at the same time; Mercantilism is a ze-
ro-sum-game which leads to “beggar thy neigh-
bor” type of policies.11
East Asian countries and China are often re-
garded as the obvious culprits, mainly because 
they keep undervalued exchange rates, which 
helps to build current account surpluses and 
huge reserves. Export subsidies and import 
duties are the traditional protectionist policies, 
but we also have selective credit systems, the 
management of the exchange rate, tax exemp-
tion on reinvested profits, domestic wages/
incomes compression, subsidies to Research 
and Development, product standards, rules of 
origin etc.. Needless to say the opposition to 
the free movement of people quite often com-
plements neo-protectionist policies.
11 At the beginning of the seventeen century Thomas 
Mun a director of the British East India Company wrote“….
we must observe this rule; to sell more to strangers yearly 
than we consume of theirs in value.”(Mun,1623?, p. 5). Mun 
goes on defending the role of trade with the East-Indies 
(ibid., p. 7). In Mun’s balance of trade system a surplus in 
foreign trade is the main cause of national wealth.
We must not confuse today Mercantilistic 
approach with the lack of competition on in-
ternational markets. During the last thirty years 
there have been many newcomers in inter-
national markets, in particular in East Asia. 
However, this has very little to do with the idea 
of competition characterized by a multitude of 
independent producers, this is a competition 
among giants. In many sectors: from automo-
tive, to capital equipment, to infrastructure, 
to international finance there is a strong con-
centration of productive capacity, also throu-
gh mergers and acquisition. At the world level 
these sectors are characterized by oligopo-
listic competition, in which big transnational 
companies either organize cartels and lobby 
for the state to support them with appropriate 
policies.
In 1776 Adam Smith wrote against the alliance 
between big corporations and the state becau-
se it could lead to lower growth and it could 
also modify the nature of society. 
This alliance could perpetuate and even 
enlarge the differences between the di-
fferent market players, thus increasing 
imbalances instead of reducing them 
(see Smith 1776, book IV,iii.c.9-10).
Today economic forces look very powerful and 
we must inevitably ask ourselves how all those 
nice ideas of development as a complex and 
multi-faces process could be put into practice. 
How to enlarge people capabilities in an effec-
tive way? Would not people be overwhelmed 
by the economic forces and rising inequality? 
What about the new SDGs and global partner-
ship? It looks as if on one side we had an ideal 
process of development which however risks to 
be just in our debates and imagination because 
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on the other side there is the real world, whe-
re capitalist markets continuously reshape the 
economic and social structures in which deve-
lopment should take place. In oligopolistic mar-
kets firms try to bend the market  mechanisms 
to their interests.
International finance too is an example of an 
oligopolistic market in which few international 
systemic banks play a dominant role, and there 
is a sort of Financial Mercantilism(see more in 
Vaggi, 2015).
How can Agenda 2030 work in these condi-
tions? 
4. On global partnership: dialogue 
and negotiations
A. SDG 17: last but not least
We have started the story of development with 
just one goal,  economic growth, now we have 
plenty of goals, targets and indicators; it is clear 
that more negotiations are needed and deci-
sions will have to be taken on the priority goals 
and on the means of implementation. The suc-
cess of the SDGs  will largely depend on and 
the way in which the priorities will be chosen 
and  how they will be supported.
In Table 1 I have organized the 17 goals and 
the 169 targets into four clusters, of course it is 
possible to group the goals in different ways(-
see for instance Loewe and Rippin, 2015, p. 4 
and OECD, 2015, p. 48). Some associations 
between the five areas of the 2015 resolution 
and the first three clusters are straightforward 
and do not need any comment.
• The Environment cluster largely inclu-
des the items in the area called Planet of 
the 2015 UN Resolution.
• The area People largely overlaps with 
the cluster Human Development. 
• The cluster Economics/Financing 
includes both economic issues and fi-
nancial means of implementation and 
it incorporates many targets of the area 
Prosperity. This cluster underlines  the 
economic dimension of sustainability, 
but it also refers to the social and econo-
mic structures which might either favour 
or constraint the progress towards the 
SDGs. Some targets belonging to goals 
which appear in the first two clusters are 
classified in the third cluster because 
they are related to financing and to the 
means of implementation.
• Partnership is the same in the 2015 Re-
solution and in the clusters.
• SDG 16 peace and justice comprises 
inclusive societies, accountability, insti-
tutions. In view of the many complicated 
challenges that it poses SDG 16 could 
be in a cluster by itself; it could also be 
part of the partnership cluster, because 
it has vast implications in terms of global 
partnership. We leave it under Human 
Development in order to underscore the 
human rights aspect and the social di-
mension of peace: peace and justice are 
both rights and end-goals in themselves.
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The SDGs and their targets into four clusters
People
Human Development
Planet
Environment
Prosperity
Economics/Financing
Partnership
 1. Poverty              1.a
 2. Hunger         2.4, 2.5        2.3, 2.4, 2.a, 2.b, 2.c
 3. Health         3.9        3.b, 3c
 4. Education        4.b
 5. Gender        5.4, 5.a
 6. Water and sanitation  6. Water and sanitation        6.5       6.a
        7.1  7. Energy        7.b       7.a
        8.3, 8.5, 8.7, 8.8         8.4, 8.9     8. Inclusive growth       8.a, 8.b, 9.5
        9.4     9. Infrastructures       9.a
 10.2, 10.3, 10.4, 10.7   10. Reduce inequality      10.6, 10.7, 10.a,
     10.b, 10.c
       11.1, 11.5, 11.7 11. Cities      11.4, 11.c
12. Sustainable Consump-
tion
and Production
       12.1      12.6, 12.7, 12.a, 
     12.c
13. Climate change        13.1, 13.a      
14. Oceans        14.b      14.4, 14.6, 14.7, 
     14.a, 14.c
15. Territorial ecosystems        15.a, 15.b      15.6, 15.7,
16. Peace, justice
and institutions
       16.4      16.3, 16.8
      17.7   17.1-17.5, 17.11, 17.12 17. Global 
partnership
The cluster classification requires some com-
ments.
First, the targets in grey could fit into different 
clusters, they show that there are many over-
lapping among the different goals and that the 
large number and the complexity of the targets 
require more dialogue and negotiations among 
all the stakeholders.
Second, Table 1 explicitly mentions only those 
targets which appear in a cluster different from 
that of the goal they refer too.
Third and most important, most goals and tar-
gets are heavily interconnected, a point often 
repeated  in the UN September 2015 Reso-
lution(see for instance UN 2015, p. 11, point 
55). In general Table 1 shows that many of the 
targets included in the first sixteen goals have 
Source: Original elaboration from the author
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to do with negotiations and require a dialogue 
among all stakeholders, this is why they appear 
in the partnership cluster.
Whatever the classification of the diffe-
rent goals without a serious partnership 
made up of a continuous dialogue and 
thorough negotiations the SDGs will lar-
gely stay on paper.
The need to negotiate the actual cooperation 
policies plus the considerations of section III on 
the growing economic imbalances imply that 
“the global partnership for sustainable develo-
pment” of SDG 17 should be based on a basic 
principle:
to re-balance the economic and power 
relationships between the different actors.
This paper strongly contents that the re-balan-
cing of negotiating powers is the only principle 
which could lead to an effective partnership 
and hopefully could lead to improvement on the 
road to the SDGs by 2030. This is because of 
two facts with which Agenda 2030 has to con-
front itself:
• first, the  to the complexity and to the in-
terconnectedness of all goals and targets, 
which is also represented  in Table 1;
• second, the variety and the existing differen-
ces among all the stakeholders, see chart 1.
These two conditions cannot be by-passed and 
must be accepted as aspects of the real world 
in which Agenda 2030 must be implemented. 
The two conditions also explain why it might be 
difficult to have a real and effective partnership 
for development. Re-balancing is an attempt 
to put the dialogue and negotiations which are 
the content of the partnership on a more rea-
listic footing; on one side it acknowledges the 
existing differences and on the other it tries to 
overcome them.
Probably international cooperation will not cea-
se to be mainly donor-driven, but the role of 
traditional donors will become less and less re-
levant and more voices from the ‘global south’ 
will make themselves heard. In order to have a 
useful dialogue it is necessary to give concre-
te substance to global partnership, subsection 
V.B. will provide some examples.
SDG 17 says: strengthen the means of imple-
mentation and revitalize the global partnership 
for sustainable development, with 19 targets 
and three systemic issues, see Table 2.
Table 2 
SDG 17 and its composition
5 Groups       12 targets in the first 4 groups   7 targets in the 3 systemic issues              
Finance 5
Technology 3
Capacity building 1
Trade 3
Systemic issues 3 Policy and institutional coherence             
2 Multi-stakeholder partnership                    
2 Data monitoring and accountability          
Source: Original elaboration from the author
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hip and global partnership require that coopera-
tion should be a dialogue among less unequal 
partners. At the moment partners are very much 
different in terms of wealth, trade and financial 
capacities, knowledge.  The re-balancing of 
negotiating capacities should be the leading 
principle in order to achieve an  effective global 
partnership.
This process of re-balancing requires at least 
three steps.
Step 1: country ownership.
Faced with a lot of goals and targets each coun-
try will have to decide its priorities; it is hard to 
imagine Malawi moving ahead on all SDGs 
and their targets. There must be a mechanism 
which should lead to identification of the coun-
try’s main objectives.
Countries in the south should set their 
own agenda. Something like this, even if not 
so clearly stated, is mentioned in target 17.15 
which asks for no donors’ driven programs at 
the country level. This is not so simple as it mi-
ght appear, because some decisions could not 
be at harmony with the opinion of the ‘donors’. It 
is easy to imagine situations in which the diffe-
rent stakeholders could have different priorities. 
The whole process might require procedures, 
negotiations and a lot of time and truthfulness 
by all the sides involved.
Step 2: trilateral dialogue 
Dialogue and negotiations will take place 
among traditional donors and recipient coun-
tries but not only. There are the so called “new 
donors” which are mainly countries, such as the 
BRICS and other emerging economies, but the-
re are also other stakeholders which can pro-
vide both resources and technical assistance: 
development banks, philanthropy institutions, 
sovereign funds, private investors, business 
people. In principle all these actors should dis-
cuss and agree on the most appropriate deve-
lopment policies, see Chart 1.
If global partnership must be effective then the 
outcomes of the various forums from Rome 
2003 to the Addis Ababa conference on Fi-
nancing for Development of July 2015 should 
be adopted by all stakeholders. Old and New 
donors should give the same message and 
agree on the various aid effectiveness criteria, 
the main issue being policy coherence in coo-
peration activities and coherence also between 
trade and aid policies. All the principles which 
have been agreed during the several forums of 
the years two thousand at the OECD-DAC level, 
see section II.B. above, should be accepted by 
all donors, old and new ones. This policy cohe-
rence by old and new donors is not at all easy; 
a lot of aid and loans are still ‘tide’, but consider 
also labour standards and migrants’ rights, tax 
competition to attract investments and so on. 
Moreover it is not just a matter of making ‘new 
donor countries’ to agree on these principles, 
but to involve also several very different private 
institutions.
Step 3 is the core of the argument and requires 
a section on its own.
B. Step 3: universality and differentiation 
and the need for policy space
Consultations and dialogue should  allow deve-
loping countries more negotiating power. This 
follows from the need of re-balancing a situa-
tion with large asymmetries. When the parties 
are very much different in terms of resources, 
capacities and power, the re-balancing of these 
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powers helps to guarantee a fairer game; this 
process might require limitations for the most 
powerful actors and additional possibilities for 
the weaker parties.
Re-balancing is needed because of the exis-
ting asymmetries which are neither eliminated 
nor reduced by market forces. The principle of 
re-balancing is the logical consequences of the 
two principles of universality and differentiation 
which are often quoted in the UN 2015 Reso-
lution, but which also appear in other official 
documents(see for instance ERD, 2015  pp. 
310-ff. and UN-SR, 2014, n. 84). Universali-
ty means that SDGs are for all countries and 
for all people, not just for the poorer countries 
and all stakeholders should be committed to 
them. Differentiation recognizes that contribu-
tions to the achievement of the SDGs depend 
on the different capacities and needs of the 
different countries. The principle of “common 
but differentiated responsibility” derives from 
the Rio+20 conference(see for instance Bola-
ji-Adio, 2015, pp. 2, 8).
These considerations imply  full use of policy 
space by developing countries (SDG 17.15, 
see also UNCTAD, 2014 and Eurodad, 2014); 
they must be allowed to implement policies and 
actions which could reduce the distance with 
both high income countries and the emerging 
economic powers.
Let us indicate some of the main areas where 
policy space is needed and on which human 
and institutional capacities should focus, in 
brackets the reference to some specific targets 
which appear in the SDGs.
1. Trade, Special and Differential Treatment 
(10.a)
2. Industrial policies: Export, Taxes, Invest-
ments, exchange rate
3. Decent work, Migrations (8.8, 10.7, 10.c) 
4. Public finances and budget: tax system, 
subsidies
5. Social protection systems (1.3).
Let me examine the implementation of policy 
space in three main areas: trade relations, in-
dustrial and budgetary policies, social protec-
tion systems.
First, trade relations are a typical case in 
which applying the same rules to players with 
enormous differences as to their economic 
structure and productive capacity would be 
against fairness and probably would also lead 
to inefficient outcomes.
Following the Uruguay Round Agreement and 
the establishment of the World Trade Organi-
zation in 1995 the possibility for developing 
countries to intervene in foreign trade has been 
greatly constrained. Trade negotiations have to 
be based on the principle of reciprocity among 
all trading partners and this has generated 
some paradoxical situations.12
As UNCTAD points out (see UNCTAD 2014 
pp.82-ff.) some flexibility still exists particularly 
for developing countries. These exceptions to 
the general obligations which are incorporated 
into the main trade agreements go under the 
name of special and differential treatment, 
SDT. However, far from being an exception SDT 
should be the norm in so far as it helps to re-ba-
lance the very large differences in productive 
12 The group of UN experts on financing for develop-
ment  asks for  trade and investment rules to be geared 
towards the sustainable development of poorer countries 
(see UN-ICESDF, 2014, pp. 41-42).
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nomies on one side and of Low Income and 
Least Developed countries on the other. SDT 
in trade is mentioned in SDG 10.a. The major 
problems do not concern trade in goods and 
services, but international agreements on pro-
perty rights, investments, dispute settlements, 
financial services in general. 
The 2001 Everything But Arms, EBA, EU 
approach to trade with developing countries is a 
good example of Special and Differential Treat-
ment; EBA implies duty-free and quota-free 
imports to the EU from the Least Developed 
Countries, but for armaments.
Regional integration and coordination 
among countries in the south would also 
greatly help the process of re-balancing diffe-
rent negotiating powers. The Economic Part-
nership Agreements, EPAs, originating out of 
the Cotonou agreement of 2000 between the 
EU and the group of African, Caribbean, Paci-
fic, ACP, countries have acknowledged the prin-
ciple that negotiations take place between the 
EU and regional groups and not with individual 
countries. Unfortunately it took more than ten 
years of negotiations to reach some final agree-
ments(see Vaggi and Evans 2002).
Regional integration would help developing 
countries to achieve a stronger negotiating po-
sition and it would encourage the countries to 
establish regular procedures for consultations 
at the regional level(see Ramsamy, et al. 014). 
Think of infrastructures,  energy, logistic, all is-
sues  which should be dealt with  at a suprana-
tional level. African countries are trying to have 
a common strategy also on SDG 16 which fo-
cus on good governance and peace(see Bola-
ji-Adio,  2015, pp. vi, 11).
Second, industrial and budgetary policies 
are among the most important policy tools to 
be used to reduce the productive capacity ga-
p(see UNCTAD, 2014, p. 92). Industrial policies 
have been widely adopted in East Asia, but in 
the past also in OECD countries. The govern-
ment intervenes to promote technological in-
novations and to sustain exports, this can be 
done with direct subsidies and tax exemptions 
but also through favourable credit  conditions. 
Special Economic Zones are an example of 
active industrial policies, mainly designed to 
attract Foreign Direct Investments, FDIs which 
are extremely popular in developing econo-
mies. Inside these zones labour relations and 
labour standards hardly adhere to those recom-
mended by ‘decent work’, which is part of SDG 
8. ECLAC ask for the possibility to implement 
environmentally-focused industrial policies(see 
ECLAC, 2016 p. 70).
In order to implement these policies and also to 
fight poverty developing countries need fiscal 
space, that is to say a budgetary policy which is 
countercyclical and in particular it allows coun-
tries to expand public expenditures in periods of 
declining growth(see ECLAC, 2016, pp. 67-8). 
The fiscal system is another important dimen-
sion of the policy space(see UNCTAD, 2014 pp. 
161-2). Developing countries still derive a lot of 
their public revenues from taxes on foreign tra-
de and from indirect taxation in general. Tax re-
venues are already the largest domestic source 
of finance in Africa with  a tax to GDP ratio of 
17%, OECD countries have a 35% or more(see 
Mackie, and Williams 2015, p.7). However the 
tax composition needs to be improved. Develo-
ping countries need to widen their tax base and 
to rely more on income taxes, not to mention 
wealth taxes, but raising domestic resources 
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for development is a big challenge(see Touray, 
2014). To increase the public revenue from inco-
mes takes time and implies major advances in 
good governance and also in administrative ca-
pacities. Without  major improvement in tax co-
llection and in the fiscal system in general there 
is no way to have a more equitable society and 
to reduce the dependence from foreign funds. 
Of course the shift towards a more efficient and 
more equitable tax systems would require time 
and  support from foreign stakeholders.
More policy space for Low Income and Lower 
Middle Income countries implies granting them 
the possibility to adopt active policies to promo-
te development, with a direct involvement of the 
government13. The active role of the state in pro-
moting domestic productive capacities and in 
strengthening the country’s position in foreign 
trade might look like a neo-mercantilist policy. 
However, there is a major difference between 
the developmental role of the state in develo-
ping countries and neo-mercantilism:
• the former aims at reducing the distan-
ces between Low and High Income 
countries;
• the latter aims at maintaining and even 
enlarging these differences.
In Upper Middle Income Countries which 
have already reached decent levels of income 
per capita the developmental role of the state 
should focus on domestic demand and on its 
composition.
Third, social protection systems, SPS, in 
Europe we could use the term ‘welfare system’. 
Social protection is meant to avoid the worse-
13 On the developmental role of the state in Asian eco-
nomic growth see Wade, 1990.
ning of the conditions of the poorest people, 
remember that the first transformative shift of 
the High Level Panel document is leave no one 
behind (see UN-HLP, 2013). Social protection 
for those who have more difficulties is a way to 
re-balance an unfair, may be even dangerous, 
situation and it fits well with the general princi-
ple of reducing the differences and giving more 
opportunities to the weakest social groups.  
Social protection floors are mentioned  in the 
document by the group of experts on develo-
pment finance (see UN-ICESDF, 2014, p. 22), 
where we also find the term global safety nets 
(ibid., p. 44), an expression which had already 
been used during the debt crisis of the eighties.
Europe could provide a major contribution to 
this debate because in many ways the welfare 
system is a unique social and political experi-
ment of Europe. The welfare system originated 
in Europe during the last century and in most 
High Income Countries it achieved major re-
sults in the years between 1945 and 1980(see 
Piketty, 2013), contributing  to the emergence of 
what we call ‘middle class’. The challenges are 
straightforward:
• will this welfare system survive in the 
countries where it exists?
• will it be extended to emerging/develo-
ping countries?
The Eurodad-Ibis position paper for the 2015 
Addis Ababa conference on Financing for De-
velopment stresses the issue that a compre-
hensive system of social protection is already 
part of the commitment of the UN states(see 
Eurodad-Ibis, 2015, p.6).
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rise of international finance is more worrying 
that that of East Asia. In the latter case there are 
countries and governments with whom it is ne-
cessary to carry on a dialogue on many relevant 
partnership issues, such as climate change, hu-
man rights, labour conditions, trade regulations 
etc. The partners are well identified and there are 
also forums where debates could take place.
In the case of finance it is much less clear who 
the partners are and how to have a debate. 
Where are the institutional settings for the ne-
gotiations? We all know the big international 
investment banks, but there are a myriad of di-
fferent types of funds, some financial centers, 
such as Wall Street and the City, and other offs-
hore centers. Capital, not labour, is fully mobile 
across countries and the number and types of 
financial products continuously increase.  Most 
derivative products are not traded in regulated 
financial markets, but they are negotiated ‘Over 
The Counter’, that is to say with agreements 
and contracts between two or more parties and 
without any type of supervisory authority. How 
is it possible to open a dialogue for develop-
ment with these international financial inves-
tors? We know how volatile financial flows are 
and how dangerous this volatility has been for 
developing countries(see Akyuz, 2005). Inflows 
can be either a blessing or a curse, but unfortu-
nately since  the capital flows to Latin America 
of the late seventies we have seen a lot of capi-
tal reversal, or outflows which have had terrible 
consequences on developing countries. This 
was the case during the big debt crises of the 
eighties, Argentina had similar problems be-
tween 1995 and 2001 and even recently some 
African countries risk economic crises because 
of their international debts.
Conclusions
Steps 1, 2 and 3 will never materialize without 
good governance, not only in the sense of avoi-
ding or at least limiting corruption, but also in 
terms of institutional and administrative capaci-
ty. Target 16.a mentions  the need to “streng-
then relevant national institutions… for building 
capacities at all level”. Without major improve-
ments in administrative and institutional capa-
cities it would be impossible to achieve the new 
SDGs and global partnership for sustainable 
development will be an empty statement.
Re-balancing plus the improvement of institu-
tional capacities in developing countries should 
prevent the widening of the gap between the 
partners and smooth the existing differences. 
Re-balancing is in line with Montesquieu’s fa-
mous tripartite division of powers, without this 
separation there is no freedom(see Montes-
quieu, 1748 vol. 1 p.164). Checks and balances 
imply the existence of counteracting forces: “In 
order to avoid that someone abuses of power, it 
is necessary that, in the state of things, power 
obstruct  power” (ibid., pp. 162-3).
Economic growth could produce checks and 
balances and it might reduce differences, but it 
could also increase distances and concentrate 
economic power into few big firms. There is no 
automatic trickle down mechanism of economic 
growth; free trade and free capital movements 
cannot guarantee that the development goals 
will be achieved.  Free trade is an extremely 
powerful mechanism and after centuries of 
wars in Europe Montesquieu could even wri-
te  that “the natural consequence of trade is to 
bring peace”(ibid., vol. 2, p. 8). More than two 
centuries later referring to Montesquieu Hirsch-
man will speak of doux commerce, sweet trade, 
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as a formidable argument for capitalism(see 
Hirschman, 1977, p. 60). However trade could 
also be quite sour and the same for finance. 
Development is no automatic by product of 
economic growth, positive actions and policis 
are needed to generate more equitable and 
inclusive societies. Goals are like a lighthouse 
showing the direction;  economy, finance and 
even politics are the ocean in which we have 
to navigate. SDG 17 on global partnership is 
about the rules on the boat.
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